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Genetic Information: A Metaphor 
In Search of a Theory* 
Paul E. Griffithstt 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science 
University of Pittsburgh 
John Maynard Smith has defended against philosophical criticism the view that devel- 
opmental biology is the study of the expression of information encoded in the genes by 
natural selection. However, like other naturalistic concepts of information, this "teleo- 
semantic" concept is equally applicable to many non-genetic factors in development. 
Maynard Smith also fails to show that developmental biology is concerned with teleo- 
semantic information. Some other ways to support Maynard Smith's conclusion are 
considered. It is argued that on any definition of information the view that development 
is the expression of genetic information is misleading. Some reasons for the popularity 
of that view are suggested. 
1. Introduction: Information Talk in Biology. 
An organism's physiology and behaviour are dictated largely by its 
genes. And those genes are merely repositories of information written 
in a surprisingly similar manner to the one that computer scientists 
have devised for the storage and transmission of other information 
... ("Drowning in Data" 1999, 97) 
The only controversial feature of this statement is the claim that behavior 
is largely genetic. It is conventional wisdom that insofar as the traits of 
an organism are subject to biological explanation, those traits express in- 
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formation coded in the organism's genes. Conventional wisdom has re- 
cently been defended in this journal by the eminent biologist John May- 
nard Smith. (2000a,b) I will argue, however, that the only truth reflected 
in the conventional view is that there is a genetic code by which the se- 
quence of DNA bases in the coding regions of a gene corresponds to the 
sequence of amino acids in the primary structure of one or more proteins. 
The rest of "information talk" in biology, and the claim that biology "is, 
itself, an information technology" ("Drowning in Data" 1999, 97), is on 
a par with the claim that the planets compute their orbits around the sun 
or that the economy computes an efficient distribution of goods and re- 
sources. It a way to talk about correlation that, in some cases, allows a 
useful application of the mathematical theory of communication and in 
others plays no theoretical role but merely reflects the current cultural 
prominence of information technology. Taking "information talk" in bi- 
ology too seriously is not merely a journalist's error. Many biologists, 
when asked to talk about their discipline in broad, philosophical terms, 
would represent it in the same light. Nevertheless, as Sahotra Sarkar has 
noted: 
there is no clear, technical notion of "information" in molecular bi- 
ology. It is little more than a metaphor that masquerades as a theo- 
retical concept and ... leads to a misleading picture of possible ex- 
planations in molecular biology. (Sarkar 1996,187) 
Correcting the conventional wisdom is important in its own right, but 
it may also clear the ground for an important new approach to the debate 
over "genetic determinism." Expanding on a remark by Susan Oyama 
(2000a), Phillip Kitcher has joked that arguing against genetic determin- 
ism is like "battling the undead." (Kitcher 2001) The "interactionist con- 
sensus" that all traits depend on both genetic and environmental factors 
has been reaffirmed again and again, but the discovery that genes are 
involved in the development of a trait continues to be used to infer that 
the trait will be hard to change by manipulating the environment. This 
inference persists in the face of widespread agreement that there are always 
other causal factors involved in the development of "genetic" traits and 
many examples of "genetic" traits being modified via these factors. For 
example, genetic diseases can be treated by environmental (i.e., drug or 
dietary) interventions. "But why, then," Kitcher's frustrated interactionist 
asks, "do we always end up discussing whether genotypes are all-powerful 
in development?" (Kitcher 2001, 404) In my view, an important part of 
the answer has been given by Susan Oyama. (2000a,b) Genetic causation 
is interpreted deterministically because genes are thought to be a special 
kind of cause. Genes are instructions-they provide information-whilst 
other causal factors are merely material. The intuitive notion of infor- 
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mation is a semantic notion, carrying the implication that genes, unlike 
other causal factors, are about, or directed at, the outcomes they help to 
produce. Little wonder, then, that the gene-trait relationship seems intu- 
itively more context-independent than the relationship between traits and 
other causes. The temperature of the nest determines the sex of a crocodile, 
the eggs developing as male at intermediate temperature and female at 
extreme temperatures, but outside that very particular context the cause- 
a mound of rotting vegetation with a temperature between n and m de- 
grees-retains no connection with masculinity. In contrast, even when the 
informational gene fails to produce its effect, it remains directed at that 
effect. A "gay gene" is an instruction to be gay even when the person 
carrying it is straight. 
If Oyama is correct, then finding a new way to think about genetic 
causation is a necessary prerequisite to laying the unquiet ghost of the 
nature/nurture controversy and learning to think clearly about the inter- 
action of genetic and other factors in development. But the deflation of 
information talk would be a clarification of the real nature of explanation 
in molecular biology even if Oyama's larger claim about the causes of 
genetic determinism is incorrect, as Kitcher has argued. (2001) Hence, the 
position I will defend here is a limited one that I have elsewhere called the 
"parity thesis." (Griffiths and Knight 1998) Any defensible definition of 
information in developmental biology is equally applicable to genetic and 
non-genetic causal factors in development. Definitions of information on 
which genes contain developmental information, but methylation patterns 
or incubation temperatures do not, are illegitimate because they can- 
not be "naturalized"-they ascribe properties to genes that cannot be 
grounded in physical and biological facts. The view that genes are distin- 
guished from other factors by being the locus of developmental informa- 
tion is biologically illegitimate. Whether this illegitimate view is an im- 
portant cause of the persistence of genetic determinism is a question for 
another day. (Griffiths, forthcoming) 
2. Two Concepts of Information. Concepts of information can be divided 
into two rough categories: causal information concepts and intentional 
information concepts. Causal conceptions of information derive from the 
mathematical theory of communication. (Shannon and Weaver 1949) 
Mathematical information theory studies only the quantity of information 
in a physical system. The quantity of information in a system can be un- 
derstood roughly as the amount of order in that system, or the inverse of 
the entropy (disorder) that all closed physical systems accumulate over 
time. This measure says nothing about the content of information. How- 
ever, there is a related causal notion of information content. (Dretske 
1981) Information flows over a channel connecting two systems, a receiver 
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that contains the information and a sender, the system that the informa- 
tion is about. There is a channel between two systems when the state of 
one is systematically causally related to the other, so that the state of the 
sender can be discovered by observing the state of the receiver. The causal 
information content of a signal is simply the state of affairs with which it 
reliably correlates at the other end of the channel. Thus, smoke carries 
information about fire and disease phenotypes carry information about 
disease genes. 
The second category of information concept deals with intentional in- 
formation or "semantic information." (Godfrey-Smith 1999a,b) It is in- 
formation in this sense that human thoughts and utterances are supposed 
to contain. If there is a relationship between intentional information and 
causal information it is a complex and distant one. We think about things 
with which we have only the most tenuous causal connection (e.g., undis- 
covered galaxies) and about things that do not exist (e.g., phlogiston or 
Pope Joan). The relation between thoughts and these various objects of 
thought is "intentionality" and the question of how physical systems like 
brains can exhibit intentionality is one of the most vexed issues in the 
philosophy of mind. One of the distinctive features of intentional infor- 
mation is that it can be false-it can misrepresent how things are. 
(Godfrey-Smith 1989) It is difficult to reproduce the phenomena of mis- 
representation using a causal notion of information. A signal cannot both 
correlate with a source and not correlate with it, nor can a signal correlate 
with a source that does not exist. The most promising attempts to give a 
naturalistic account of intentional information are the so-called "teleose- 
mantic" theories to be discussed below, according to which a sign repre- 
sents whatever evolution designed it to represent. Genetic information is 
usually described as if it made sense to speak of a phenotype misinter- 
preting the message in the genes and hence appears to be intentional in- 
formation. For instance, it is a common view amongst contemporary evo- 
lutionary psychologists that a genome contains a "disjunctive program" 
or "open program" for psychological development. The genetic message 
takes the form "develop like this under these circumstances, like that under 
other circumstances." Evolutionary psychologists seek to explain cultural 
differences between human minds as just this kind of disjunctive response 
of the human developmental program to various environmental factors. 
(Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow 1992) In contrast, no one says that the 
human genome encodes the instruction "when exposed to the drug thalid- 
omide grow only rudimentary limbs." But this would, indeed, be one 
branch of the disjunctive program if we were talking about the causal 
information in the human genome. When the relevant channel is contam- 
inated by thalidomide, human genes send this causal information. The 
fact that the notion of a disjunctive program is not applied to outcomes 
397 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Thu, 19 Nov 2015 06:41:31 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PAUL E. GRIFFITHS 
that are thought to be pathological, accidental, or otherwise "unintended" 
suggests that the information in the program is being conceived as inten- 
tional information. 
3. Maynard Smith on Genetic Information. The obvious way to defend 
information talk in biology is to argue that it is just like the many other, 
scientifically respectable, uses of causal information. This has been the 
traditional strategy. In an address to the Fifth International Congress of 
Evolutionary and Systematic Biology in 1996, John Maynard Smith made 
use of this conventional defense. Information talk in biology is to be in- 
terpreted "more or less in the spirit of information theory." (author's 
notes) The disadvantage of this defense is that it implies parity between 
genetic and non-genetic causes in development. Information in the sense 
legitimated by information theory is the systematic dependence of a signal 
on a source, a dependence that is created by a set of channel conditions. 
In the case of development, the genes can be taken to be the source, the 
life-cycle of the organism to be the signal and the channel conditions to 
be all the other resources needed for the life-cycle to unfold. But it is a 
fundamental feature of information theory that the role of source and 
channel condition can be reversed. The old television "test-card" did ex- 
actly that, holding the transmission constant so that the television engineer 
could read off the state of what were previously channel conditions. The 
source/channel distinction is imposed on a natural causal system by the 
observer. A source is simply one channel condition whose current state 
the signal is being used to investigate. If all other resources are held con- 
stant, a life cycle can give us information about the genes, but if the genes 
are held constant, a life cycle can give us information about whichever 
other resource we decided to let vary. So far as causal information goes, 
every resource whose state affects development is a source of develop- 
mental information. (Johnston 1987; Gray 1992; Griffiths and Gray 1994; 
Oyama 2000a) 
The fact that causal information conforms to this "parity thesis" has 
been accepted by many of the participants in the current debate over the 
interpretation of genetic information. (Godfrey-Smith 1999a; Sterelny and 
Griffiths 1999; Maynard Smith 2000a,b; Kitcher 2001) In his most recent 
discussion of causal information, Maynard Smith notes that: 
With this definition, there is no difficulty in saying that a gene carries 
information about adult form; an individual with the gene for achon- 
droplasia will have short arms and legs. But we can equally well say 
that a baby's environment carries information about growth; if it is 
malnourished, it will be underweight. (Maynard Smith 2000a, 189) 
398 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Thu, 19 Nov 2015 06:41:31 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GENETIC INFORMATION 
In response to the threat of parity, Maynard Smith has abandoned the 
idea that biological information is causal information. He continues: 
informational language has been used to characterize genetic as op- 
posed to environmental causes. I want now to try to justify this usage. 
I will argue that the distinction can be justified only if the concept 
of information is used in biology only for causes that have the prop- 
erty of intentionality.... A DNA molecule has a particular sequence 
because it specifies a particular protein, but a cloud is not black be- 
cause it predicts rain. This element of intentionality comes from nat- 
ural selection. (Maynard Smith 2000a, 189-190) 
Maynard Smith proposes to analyze the intentionality of genetic infor- 
mation using teleosemantics, the philosophical program of reducing mean- 
ing to biological function (teleology) and then reducing teleology to nat- 
ural selection. (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987) Whilst there is considerable 
controversy about whether such reductions can be successfully carried out, 
teleosemantics remains one of the more popular programs for naturalizing 
intentionality. Maynard Smith begins by arguing that natural selection is 
strongly analogous to computer programming using the "genetic algo- 
rithm" technique. The genetic algorithm programmer andomly varies the 
code of a computer program and selects variants that best perform the 
desired task. In the same way, mutation randomly varies the genes of 
organisms and natural selection chooses the organisms that have the high- 
est fitness. Just as the function of the selected computer program is to 
perform the task for which it was selected, the biological function of suc- 
cessful genes is to produce the developmental outcomes in virtue of which 
they were selected. Such genes are intentionally directed onto, or about, 
those effects. The defective hemoglobin gene in some human populations, 
which has been selected because it sometimes confers resistance to malaria, 
carries teleosemantic information about malaria resistance. 
However, teleosemantic information is fundamentally unsuited to 
Maynard-Smith's aim of avoiding parity. The most developed version of 
the teleosemantic theory of genetic information is Sterelny, Dickison, and 
Smith's "extended replicator theory." (1996) Sterelny and his collabora- 
tors recognize from the outset that teleosemantic information exists in 
both genetic and in some non-genetic developmental causes. Sterelny 
(2000) reiterates this view in his reply to Maynard Smith. Russell Gray 
and I have argued that teleosemantic information exists in a very much 
wider range of developmental causes than Sterelny et al. suggest (Griffiths 
and Gray 1997), but my argument here follows even on the more conser- 
vative view. Teleosemantic information exists in any inheritance system 
that is a product of evolution, including epigenetic inheritance systems. 
The term "epigenetic inheritance system" is used to denote any biological 
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mechanism which produces resemblances between parents and offspring 
and which works in parallel with the inheritance of nuclear and mito- 
chondrial DNA. (Jablonka and Lamb 1995; Jablonka and Szathmary 
1995) Every organism inherits a great deal besides its DNA. To develop 
normally the egg cell must contain features such as basal bodies and mi- 
crotubule organizing centers, correct cytoplasmic chemical gradients, 
DNA methylation patterns, membranes and organelles. Changes in these 
other resources can cause heritable variation that appears in all the cells 
descended from that egg cell. 
One of the best understood of these mechanisms is the DNA methyl- 
ation inheritance system. A methylation pattern is a series of additional 
chemical groups attached to a DNA sequence. Methylation patterns block 
transcription of any genes they cover and they are replicated by the meth- 
ylation copying system in all the cells descended from a given cell. Differ- 
ences in methylation are important in tissue differentiation during the life- 
time of a single organism, but they can also pass between the generations. 
Methylation patterns are often applied to the DNA in a sperm or egg by 
the parent organism in what is usually interpreted as a mechanism for 
influencing development in the offspring. This form of methylation inher- 
itance has excited a great deal of interest because of it is easy to see how 
it could play a role in conventional, micro-evolutionary change. A typical 
example comes from some controversial British research on behavioral 
differences in male and female children. The proposed mechanism for the 
transmission of these behavioral differences is that female humans meth- 
ylate a sequence of the X-chromosome in their gametes, so that males, 
who get only one X-chromosome and get it from their mother, cannot 
transcribe the genes in that region. Hence certain gene products are denied 
to all males. Males demethylate that sequence in their sperm cells, so fe- 
males get readable copies of these genes on the X-chromosomes they re- 
ceive from their fathers. (Skuse et al. 1997) Naturally, when this research 
was reported in the media it was announced as the discovery that sex 
differences are in the genes: "Genes say boys will be boys, and girls will 
be sensitive." (Radford 1997) 
Epigenetic inheritance research has focused on mechanisms within the 
cell. Developmental systems thinkers have emphasized a wider range of 
epigenetic mechanisms. (Gray 1992; Griffiths and Gray 1994, 2001) The 
characteristics of epigenetic inheritance systems within the cell are shared 
by many extra-cellular structures. Some castes of the aphid Colophina 
arma require a growth spurt as part of their life-cycle. These and only 
these castes inherit the micro-organisms that make the chemicals on which 
this growth spurt depends. (Moran and Baumann 1994) The morphology 
of queens and the colony structure of the fire ant Solenposis invicta differ 
radically between genetically similar lineages of the species because of sta- 
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bly replicated pheromonal nest "cultures." (Keller and Ross 1993) Any 
queen raised in a colony with a particular culture will found a colony with 
the same culture, as shown by moving eggs from one culture to the other. 
Many parasites, both vertebrate and invertebrate, maintain associations 
with particular host species over evolutionary time through "host- 
imprinting." Thus, some insects lay their eggs on the plant whose leaves 
they tasted as larvae. Some parasitic finches lay their eggs in the nest of 
the host species which they imprinted on as chicks. (Immelmann 1975) 
"Host switching" occurs on the rare occasions when this mechanism mal- 
functions and the mother lays her eggs on the wrong plant or in the wrong 
nest. On the still more rare occasions when these misplaced eggs flourish, 
the imptinting mechanism will ensure that this new, epigenetic mutant 
form reliably reproduces itself. Clearly, all the mechanisms discussed here 
are candidates for adaptive explanation. This means that the physical 
traces by which these mechanisms operate are as likely to have biological 
functions as any other putative adaptation and thus, on the teleosemantic 
approach recommended by Maynard Smith, that these traces contain in- 
formation. Hence, just like causal information, teleosemantic information 
obeys the parity thesis and does not constitute the principled difference 
between genetic and other causes that Maynard Smith seeks. 
The mechanism of epigenetic inheritance that takes us furthest from 
the nucleus is so-called "niche construction." (Odling-Smee 1988; Odling- 
Smee, Laland, and Feldman 1996; Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 
2001) Many features of an organism's niche exist only because of the 
effects of previous generations of that species on the local environment. 
One of the earliest examples of this phenomenon to be clearly recognized 
was the co-evolution of the eucalypts with the current pattern of bush fires 
in Australia. (Mount 1964) It is, however, unclear whether the collectively 
constructed features of a species' niche can be regarded as part of each 
individual organism, and hence whether they can be assigned biological 
functions and teleosemantic information content. More theoretical work 
is needed on the interpretation of this form of inheritance. 
4. Stability and Inheritance. Opponents of the parity thesis, such as 
Maynard-Smith, are well aware of the role of non-genetic factors in de- 
velopment and have a standard strategy for discounting them. This strat- 
egy is to question the intergenerational stability of non-genetic factors, 
and/or their potential to produce the kind of variation upon which natural 
selection can act. Thus: 
Differences due to nature are likely to be inherited, whereas those due 
to nurture are not; evolutionary changes are changes in nature, not 
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nurture; traits that adapt an organism to its environment are likely to 
be due to nature. (Maynard Smith 2000a, 189) 
The special status of genetic factors is deserved for one reason only: 
genetic factors replicate themselves, blemishes and all, but non-genetic 
factors do not. (Dawkins 1982, 99) 
Clearly, the phenomenon of epigenetic inheritance defeats the simplest 
version of this defense. Developmental systems theorists have argued that 
we should define "inheritance" so that something is inherited just if it 
passes from generation to generation in such a way that evolution can act 
on its variant forms. Hence, every element of the developmental matrix 
which is reliably replicated in each generation and which plays a role in 
the production of the evolved life cycle of the organism counts as some- 
thing which is inherited. (Griffiths and Gray 1994, 2001) The more con- 
servative "extended replicator" view goes some distance in the same di- 
rection. (Sterelny, Dickison, and Smith 1996) 
It follows that genes cannot be singled out as the sources of develop- 
mental information on the grounds that they and they alone persist 
through lineages long enough for cumulative selection to act upon them. 
Lineages can be selected for having good methylation patterns or good 
symbionts or being imprinted on a good host. These features can persist 
for evolutionarily significant periods of time. (Gray 2001, Griffiths and 
Gray 2001) Some other factor needs to be added to the insistence on stable 
inheritance in order to defend the special, informational status of genes. 
One candidate is the idea that genetic causes are unique in being "sym- 
bolic" or "semiotic." In his most recent discussion, Maynard Smith claims 
that genes are symbolic and other developmental factors are not, because 
there is no intrinsic connection between the nature of the gene and the 
developmental outcome it produces. (Maynard Smith 2000a, 185) In his 
commentary on Maynard Smith, Peter Godfrey-Smith points out that the 
apparent difference is generated by looking at the distal effects of genetic 
causes, which depend on an array of other causal factors, while concen- 
trating on the proximal effects of non-genetic causes, which, like the prox- 
imal effects of DNA, are uniquely determined by physical laws. (Godfrey- 
Smith 2000, 203) In response to this criticism, Maynard Smith introduces 
a second role for biological teleology in his account of information. A 
cause is semiotic or symbolic when it has its effect via an "evolved recep- 
tor" that has been selected to confer one of many possible causal "inter- 
pretations" on the signal. (Maynard Smith 2000b, 215) Whatever its vir- 
tues as an analysis of the nature of biological information, this new 
suggestion fails to generate a principled difference between genetic and 
epigenetic causes. For example, the mechanisms of habitat and host im- 
printing described above are clearly "evolved receptors" in Maynard 
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Smith's sense. They have been selected to confer a highly specific "inter- 
pretation" on an otherwise meaningless chemical input, but in these cases 
the signal does not take the form of a DNA sequence. 
There is something fundamentally puzzling about Maynard Smith's 
decision to advocate a teleosemantic interpretation of information talk in 
biology. If genetic information is teleosemantic information then it can 
have only a distant relationship to the actual genetic code. The genetic 
code clearly does not derive its semantic aspect from teleology. The codon 
CCC codes for proline even when it is part of a section of junk DNA with 
no selection history or when it has been inserted by an incompetent bio- 
technologist who intended it to mean leucine. This problem cannot be 
fixed by regarding the biological functions of these individual DNA co- 
dons as derived from the general functions of that type of codon, since 
not all codon/amino-acid pairings are adaptations. Although there is in- 
creasing evidence that some pairings are the result of selection, others are 
very probably the result of direct chemical affinities between ancestral 
RNAs and amino acids. (Knight, Freeland and Landweber, 1999) The 
exact conclusion of current debates over the meaning of the genetic code 
is not critical, however. No imaginable outcome could lead to the revision 
of the tables of the standard and variant codes to be found in the current 
literature. The codes are based on actual causal relationships, not on judg- 
ments about adaptive function. 
More tentatively, I would suggest that insofar as information talk in 
developmental biology more generally is related to concepts of biological 
function, it is to the ahistorical, causal-contribution notion of function, 
rather than the evolutionary concept of adaptive function. In an important 
study of functional language in biology, Ronald Amundson and George 
Lauder have suggested that the causal-contribution notion of function 
predominates in sciences such as physiology and anatomy. (Amundson 
and Lauder 1994) Like physiologists and anatomists, developmental bi- 
ologists are primarily concerned with proximal explanations (how mech- 
anisms work at the current time) rather than ultimate explanations (why 
they evolved). 
5. Evolvability and Information. At this point I will leave Maynard Smith's 
most recent, teleosemantic analysis and turn to what I believe is a more 
promising approach found in his earlier work. Maynard Smith and Eors 
Szathmary have argued that the genetic inheritance system and cultural 
transmission in humans are the only two systems that display what they call 
"unlimited heredity." (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995) Only these 
"unlimited" inheritance systems, they argue, should really be thought of as 
"coding" for outcomes. To make their distinction, Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary argue that most inheritance systems can only mutate between 
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a limited number of heritable states which can be specified in advance. Hab- 
itat imnprinting, for example, can only lead organisms to choose different 
habitats and DNA methylation can only choose whether existing genes 
will be on or off. The genome and language, however, both have a recur- 
sive syntactic structure. Their basic constituents can be put together in 
many different combinations and these combinations can be of any length. 
Hence these inheritance systems have an unlimited number of possible 
heritable states. At first sight it may not clear why this provides a justifi- 
cation for viewing those systems and no others as transmitting informa- 
tion. One way to grasp the thought behind Maynard Smith and Szath- 
mary's proposal is to see them as providing an objective justification for 
fixing the source/channel distinction so that the genome or culture be- 
comes the information source. The other causes of heritable variation are 
mere channel conditions because they have relatively few alternative set- 
tings. Only in genes (or culture) do we find a signal source with enough 
possible states to signal the vast range of possibilities that evolution needs. 
The distinction between limited and unlimited heredity systems is an 
important one, and may provide insights into one of the key innovations 
that enabled the diversification of early life into the vast range of forms 
we see today. I will argue, however, that it is putting too much weight on 
the distinction to use it, as Maynard Smith and Szathmiry seem to wish, 
as a basis for the claim that developmental information resides in the genes 
and that other causal factors provide mere material support to decode this 
information. A developmental systems interpretation, according to which 
developmental information exists in the whole matrix of material resources 
that are need to reconstruct a developmental outcome, is equally consis- 
tent with the distinction between limited and unlimited heredity systems 
and with the insights into the evolutionary process that it provides. 
The limited/unlimited istinction seems to support the idea that genes 
are the signal and the rest of the developmental system is a channel because 
it suggests that the genes have a vastly greater capacity to "signal" alter- 
native outcomes. In effect, Maynard Smith and Szathmary propose to 
partition the total number of developmental outcomes that can be gen- 
erated by a developmental system between the various inheritance systems 
that make up that system. The number of outcomes allotted to an inher- 
itance system measures its "limitedness" and the genetic inheritance sys- 
tem is allotted far more outcomes than any other system. But how is this 
partition of outcomes to be made? Maynard Smith and Szathmary assume 
that the number of permutations of DNA codons, or perhaps of entire 
genes, is the relevant measure for the genetic inheritance system and that 
some corresponding measure of the number of permutations of physical 
parts is the appropriate measure for other inheritance systems. 
But these are not appropriate measures. For any given inheritance sys- 
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tem the range of physical changes that count as evolutionary changes is 
restricted to those that can be made use of by the rest of the existing 
system. The point is a familiar one with respect to the notion of"syntactic 
structure" for human languages. Not all physical differences between syn- 
tactic objects are syntactic differences. Differences in handwriting or in 
the accent with which one speaks, for example, are not syntactic differ- 
ences. 
The main lesson of the major evolutionary transitions that are the focus 
of Maynard Smith and Szathmary's work is that evolution creates entirely 
new kinds of developmental systems that massively expand the possible 
interpretations of existing developmental resources, including genes. One 
way to see this is to consider how many evolutionary possibilities come 
into existence when a "limited" heredity system undergoes a change. Con- 
sider, for example, the evolutionary possibilities that can be "signaled" by 
a base pair substitution in the DNA of a eukaryote cell that cannot be 
signaled by those substitutions in a prokaryote cell. As Maynard Smith 
and Szathmary themselves describe, that vast swathe of evolutionary pos- 
sibilities came into existence through evolutionary change mediated by a 
limited heredity system. Membranes cannot be constructed without an 
existing membrane template into which to insert newly synthesized pro- 
teins. Hence, major changes to the partitioning of the cell require variation 
to arise through the membrane heredity system, not through mutations of 
the DNA. 
In effect, the measure of "limitedness" that Maynard Smith and Szath- 
mary adopt allots to the genetic inheritance system all the outcomes that 
can be generated by making changes to that system across the full range 
of possibilities for the other systems while allocating to the other systems 
only the number of outcomes they could produce given one possible ge- 
nome. That is why it is not an appropriate measure if the limited/unlimited 
distinction is to be used to judge the capacity of inheritance systems to 
"signal" (cause) evolutionary possibilities. It would be no less (and no 
more) meaningful to allocate to the genetic inheritance system only the 
range of outcomes it could generate given one state of the other inheritance 
systems. The other inheritance systems would receive all the outcomes that 
could be generated by permuting the genetic system in the presence of the 
remaining states of that inheritance system. 
A closely related point is that the huge potential of differences in genes, 
language and perhaps pheromones in social insects to cause new evolu- 
tionary possibilities stems from the fact that these differences "mean some- 
thing" to the rest of the developmental system. If the rest of the system 
surrounding the genes were such that indefinitely many base-pair combi- 
nations collapsed into only a few developmental outcomes, then the ge- 
netic inheritance system would not be unlimited. It is not hard to imagine 
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cellular machinery with this result-the existing genetic code is substan- 
tially redundant in just this way, with several codons corresponding to the 
same amino acids. Hence, the unlimited nature of the genetic inheritance 
system is more accurately seen as a property of the developmental system 
as a whole and not of the genome in isolation. The language of separate 
"inheritance systems" can itself be highly misleading in some biological 
contexts. Methylation inheritance, for example, is a mechanism of gene 
regulation, making it odd to describe it as a separate "system" from the 
genetic "system." From a "selfish replicator" viewpoint a gene and the 
methyl groups attached to it are separate replicators, but no more so than 
any two genes. From a developmental systems viewpoint genes and meth- 
ylation patterns are separate developmental resources, but they are ele- 
ments of one developmental system. (Griffiths and Gray 2001) 
It has never been part of the developmental systems tradition to deny 
that nucleic acids and natural languages are distinctive elements of devel- 
opmental systems. The point of the "parity thesis" is to prevent these em- 
pirical differences turning into a kind of scientific metaphysics, as happens 
when genes are identified with information (or even "form") and everything 
else in development with mere matter. This distracts attention from the 
many ways in which non-genetic resources sometimes play biological roles 
more usually associated with genes. It also leads to the empirically inap- 
propriate lumping together of very different non-genetic resources (the 
"environment"). From a developmental systems perspective, unlimited he- 
redity is simply another important, empirical property of DNA, and per- 
haps of other resources, such as pheromones in their role in causing caste- 
differences in the morphology and behavior of social insects.' 
6. Developmental Switches and Bioinformatics. It is clear that an analysis 
of "information" such that genes are the sole or main bearer of develop- 
1. Another slightly different interpretation of the limited/unlimited heredity distinction 
would be to argue that only genes have the capacity to generate fine-grained response 
to selection and thus to give rise to adaptation. This point could be combined with the 
teleosemantic approach described above to yield the result that since only genes support 
genuine adaptation, only genes carry (teleo-) information. As Russell Gray has pointed 
out, this implicitly assumes that epigenetic inheritance systems must have evolutionary 
potential separately from one another and that only discrete, as opposed to continuous, 
variations count as alternative states of an inheritance system. The cards are being 
stacked against extra-genetic inheritance in numerous ways. However: 
Extragenetic changes can also be piecemeal and incremental. Just as natural selection 
can favor combinations of genes at different loci, so selection may favor combinations 
of endosymbionts. Quantitative variations in cytoplasmic factors, nest design, and 
habitat preferences could also all be passed on extragenetically. Thus, although com- 
binations of these factors are not unlimited, they can be quite large enough to allow 
a fine-grained response to selection (Gray 2001, 197) 
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mental information has still not been adequately defended. It is less clear 
why such an analysis is needed. Developmental systems theorists and other 
critics of "information talk" do not deny the unique biological role of 
genes as protein templates, nor the central role of gene products in devel- 
opment, nor do they deny "molecular Weismannism"-the prohibition 
on the inheritance of acquired characteristics via the genetic material (with 
the exception of a few retro-copying phenomena accepted on all sides). 
Conversely, advocates of the genetic program do not deny the existence, 
or even the evolutionary importance, of epigenetic inheritance. There are 
genuine disagreements among commentators on contemporary develop- 
mental biology over the relative promise of more program-like and more 
dynamicist models of gene regulation, but the lines of cleavage among the 
disputants do not align with those in the debate over genetic information, 
as Maynard Smith himself remarks. (Maynard Smith 2000b, 218) In any 
case, that dispute does not turn on whether all the information being pro- 
cessed in a developmental program comes from genetic factors. 
If the idea that "biology is an information technology" is neither ob- 
viously true nor a "forced choice" on which biologists must take a stand 
if they are to do research, why is the idea so widely accepted? Partly, of 
course, because of the central role of information in the contemporary 
scientific world-view. (Keller 1995; Oyama 2000a) Another widely ac- 
knowledged factor is the misinterpretation of Weismann diagrams. (Grie- 
semer and Wimsatt 1989; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 64; Sterelny 2000) 
The now standard diagrammatic representation of evolution shows a 
causal arrow from genes to phenotypes and a causal arrow from the genes 
of one generation to those of the next (e.g., Maynard Smith 1993, figure 
8). There are no causal arrows that represent the influence of organisms 
on the reproduction of their genes, nor the many influences that organisms 
exert on their offspring in addition to reproducing their genes. Both the 
general cultural enthusiasm for information and the modern Weismann 
diagram are clearly important in giving the genetic program its air of 
common sense. 
But there is another factor closely related to the themes of this paper 
that has been less widely acknowledged. This factor can be represented by 
a (very bad) argument: 
(1) There is a genetic code 
(2) In molecular developmental biology there is talk of signals, 
switches, master control genes, and so forth. 
(3) Therefore, the information flowing in (2) is information encoded 
in the sense of (1) 
In this blunt form the argument sounds merely frivolous. But many dis- 
cussions of molecular biology, especially those for a non-technical audi- 
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ence, insinuate something surprisingly close to it. In his recent paper, May- 
nard Smith presents something quite close to this argument in a section 
immediately preceding his analysis of biological information, entitled "Is 
the Genome a Developmental Program?" Here are the first and last sen- 
tences of the section and a representative passage from in between: 
There is, I think, no serious objection to speaking of a genetic code, 
or to asserting that the gene codes for the sequence of amino acids in 
a protein. 
However, an organism is more than a bag of specific proteins. De- 
velopment requires that different proteins be made at different times, 
in different places. A revolution is now taking place in our under- 
standing of this process. The picture that is emerging is one of a com- 
plex hierarchy of genes regulating the activity of other genes. Today, 
the notion of genes sending signals to other genes is as central as the 
notion of a genetic code was forty years ago. 
Informational terminology is invading developmental biology, as it 
earlier invaded molecular biology. In the next section I try to justify 
this usage. (Maynard Smith 2000a,187-189). 
While not quite the very bad argument given above, this series of points 
is clearly meant to suggest that since the genetic code is "real science" and 
not mere metaphor, it is only a matter of time before other information 
talk in biology becomes real science too. At best, this is a very weak in- 
ductive argument, at worst it is equivocation on the word "information." 
It is worth pointing out that a number of historians of science have sug- 
gested the exact opposite: that the history of information talk in molecular 
developmental biology is one of consistent retreat from literal to meta- 
phoric in the light of increased understanding of molecular processes. (Sar- 
kar 1996; Chadarevian 1998) 
The very bad argument (hereafter "VBA") is one aspect of what Sarkar 
means when he says that loose information talk "leads to a misleading 
picture of possible explanations in molecular biology." (Sarkar 1996, 187) 
The information metaphor suggests a "bottom-up" explanatory strategy 
in molecular biology, rather than a "top-down" one. A bottom-up strat- 
egy tries to infer the developmental significance of a DNA sequence from 
the sequence itself, looking at the sequence to determine its product and 
looking at that product and other gene products to determine how they 
will interact in development. The alternative, top-down strategy begins by 
studying the developmental process, works out which gene products are 
involved and uses the sequence of these products to locate the DNA se- 
quences from which they are made. A realistic picture of work in contem- 
porary developmental biology is that it is at least as much top-down as 
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bottom-up. Note also that the top-down strategy automatically locates 
and takes account of epigenetic causal factors in development, while the 
bottom-up strategy finds their involvement in developmental processes an 
obstacle to upward progress. 
I recently came across a rather striking example of the use of the VBA 
to suggest that molecular developmental biology proceeds by a pure 
bottom-up strategy. Once again, sequential quotations can be fitted into 
the framework of the VBA: 
One great discovery was that a set of three rungs contains the infor- 
mation to make one amino acid. So the set of rungs AAA will make 
one amino acid, while the rungs ACG will make a different amino 
acid. 
After [the human genome project] we can look for the small section 
of DNA that holds the instructions to grow a new arm.... molecular 
biologists studying the common fruit fly found the section of DNA 
that controlled the growth of its eyes. They learnt to switch on the 
growth of eyes ... 
But even when we have mapped the whole of the human DNA, there's 
another hurdle to jump before we can start growing arms. The DNA 
is huge! ... That's why the science of bioinformatics has been in- 
vented. (Kruszelnicki 1998) 
These quotes are from a leaflet issued to persuade students to enroll in a 
degree in bioinformatics. Bioinformatics is designed to produce biologi- 
cally literate graduates trained in computational techniques that will allow 
them to handle the vast amounts of information about genes currently 
being generated by molecular biology. But deft use of the VBA suggests 
that bioinformatics deals with developmental information encoded in 
genes-the blueprint for life, and a much more exciting prospect for 
school-leavers than applied computing. 
7. Conclusion: The Code, the Code and Nothing but the Code. The existence 
of the genetic code-the standard pairing of codons and amino acids and 
its seventy-odd minor variants-is beyond question. Beyond that, how- 
ever, "information talk" in biology has nothing to do with the genetic 
code. Information talk in the various forms related to the mathematical 
theory of communication is equally applicable to non-genetic develop- 
mental factors. So too are the cybernetic locutions found in molecular 
developmental biology. Genes can be discussed in terms of their teleose- 
mantic properties, but so can many non-genetic factors. It is also unlikely 
that this teleosemantic sense is what is intended by most information talk 
in molecular developmental biology, which is a science of proximate mech- 
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anisms, not of ultimate origins. There are numerous important differences 
between what DNA does in development and the roles played by other 
causal factors, but these differences do not map onto a distinction between 
informational and material causation. The present atmosphere, in which 
information talk is only applied to genes, makes that way of talking highly 
misleading. I have suggested here that it misleads people about the forms 
of explanation in molecular biology. I also believe that the asymmetrical 
use of information talk partly explains the persistence of genetic deter- 
minism, but that is an argument for another day. 
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